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CASE COMMENTS
A NEW CONCEPT OF FRAUD ON THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE - A COMMENT ON IN RE CADY
ROBERTS & CO.
Respondent broker, a member of a registered brokerage
firm, received information regarding a stock dividend reduc-
tion from a director of the Curtis-Wright corporation who
was also an associate of the brokerage firm. Unknown to
the director there had been a telegraphic delay in transmit-
ting the action of the board of directors to the exchange so
that at the time of his conversation with respondent the in-
formation had not yet been made public. Knowing the in-
formation had not yet reached the exchange and without
disclosing the dividend action, respondent executed two sell
orders for discretionary accounts - one for 2,000 shares for
ten accounts and the other to sell short 5,000 shares for eleven
accounts. Two days prior to the dividend meeting respondent
had disposed of 6,500 shares, 4,300 of which had been sold
on the date in question but prior to the time of the conversa-
tion between respondent and the director. The orders were
executed approximately one-half hour before the announce-
ment of the dividend reduction appeared on the ticker. In re
Cady Roberts Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 6668, No-
vember 8, 1961.
In a proceeding brought under the authority of Section
19(a) (3) of the Securities Exchange Act,' the Commission
held that respondent's conduct was a willful violation of the
anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act 2 and
that it was in the public interest to suspend respondent from
the exchange for 20 days.3 The Commission held that receipt
1. 48 Stat. 898 (1934), 15 U. S. C. §78s(a) (3) (1960).
2. Securities Act of 1933 §17(a), 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U. S. C.
§77q(a) (1958); Securities Exchange.Act of 1934 §10(b), 48 Stat. 891
(1934), 15 U. S. C. §78j (b) (1958); SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C. F. R.
§240.10b-5 (1949).
3. Under §19(a) (3) the remedies available to the Commission were
imposition of a fine and/or suspension from the exchange. In the instant
case respondents submitted an offer for settlement whereby the facts
stipulated were agreed to constitute the record for the purpose of deter-
miing the occurrence of a willful violation of the designated anti-fraud
provisions and the entering of an appropriate order, on the condition that
no sanction be entered in excess of a suspension of the broker, Gintel,
for twenty days from the New York Stock Exchange. The offer of settle-
ment was submitted pursuant to §5(b) of the Administrative Procedure
Act and Rule 8 of the Rules of Practice of the Securities Exchange
Commission.
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of non-public information imposes an affirmative duty to dis-
close analagous to that of a corporate insider who acquires
knowledge by virtue of his position and that this duty ex-
tends both to transactions on an exchange as well as face-to-
face dealings. The obligation to disclose stems from posses-
sion of non-public information and the inherent unfairness
involved where one party takes advantage of such information
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.
The Commission further held that the duty was two-fold:
either to disclose or, in the alternative, if disclosure were not
possible or practical, to refrain from dealing until the in-
formation had been made available to the public. Use of
such information by one with insider disclosure duties is a
deceptive practice or course of business amounting to a fraud
within the meaning of Rule 10b-5(3) promulgated under
Section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
4
One of the fundamental characteristics of a free securities
market is its sensitivity to the diverse factors which in-
fluence investors' evaluation of their future interests and
future price movements.5 Changes in the economic climate
both here and abroad, changes in the political or economic
relations with other countries, new discoveries, sudden in-
creases in product popularity, and many other factors can
substantially affect security prices in a very brief period of
time. This inherent instability is at once both the virtue of
the field because of the possibility of great profits and its
defect because of the increased opportunity and temptation
for abuse.6 Because security investment is essential to a
healthy economy, there has long been great concern to in-
sure a fair and honest market which reflects an evaluation
of securities in the light of all available and pertinent data.
The means toward this end has been.to eliminate as much as
possible the abuses which arise from unfair practices by those
who deal in the securities market. The courts and Congress
4. In re Cady Roberts & Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 6668,
November 8, 1961.
5. "The entire field of securities transaction is to some degree spec.
ulative in nature, and sales, are usually motivated by a difference in
opinion between vendor and purchaser regarding the future prospects of
the particular security involved." Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp.
753, 764 (D. N. J. 1955).
6. "The business of trading in securities is one in which opportunities
for dishonesty are of constant recurrence and ever present. It engages
acute, active minds, trained to quick apprehension, decision and action."
Archer v. SEC, 133 F. 2d 795, 803 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 319 U. S.
767,87 L. Ed. 1711 (1943).
[Vol. 15
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seek to protect those who do not know market conditions from
the overreachings of those who do7 by holding insiders to
the highest standards of honesty and fair play.8 "Intimacy
demands restraint lest the uninformed be exploited." D
The development of the common law in this area was slow
and was greatly hampered by the many technicalities of the
common law actions. Strained constructions and fictional
exceptions were employed by the courts to provide remedies
for the most flagrant abuses, but this led to great diversity
of interpretation and application of the common law rules
from state to state. Judicial remedy was neither uniform nor
certain; general regulation was beyond the authority of the
courts. The principal stains on the integrity of the market
were those market practices which were unfair but were
short of actual common law fraud. These practices were be-
yond the pale of the words. Recognizing the need for na-
tional legislation in this area, Congress in 1933 and again in
1934 enacted laws to extend the right of private action to
more of those who are injured by insider abuses. The prin-
cipal thrust of the laws, however, is aimed at regulation of
the practices which injure, thus cutting down the need for
private remedy by striking directly at the source of the abuse.
Based on the underlying theme of full and fair disclosure,10
the Congressional attack is two-pronged: (1) statutory lan-
guage broad enough to avoid the limitation of strict sub-
stantive rules which had plagued the common law courts,
(2) an administrative agency with police and supervisory
authority to construe and enforce the Act. In order to main-
tain fair and open markets for the buying and selling of
securities and to prevent abuse of the facilities provided by
the exchanges, the Act imposes regulatory control in the
form of disclosure requirements upon the national securities
7. Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F. 2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943).
8. "The best element of business has long since decided that honesty
should govern competitive enterprises and that the rule of caveat emptor
should not be relied on to reward fraud and deception." Federal Trade
Com'n v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U. S. 112, 116, 82 L. Ed. 141, 145
(1937).
9. In re Cady Roberts & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 6668, November 8, 1961, 34-6668.
10. This use of disclosure to promote the integrity of the securities
market is considered by Loss to be an embodiment of the concept that
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exchanges, upon the practices employed in trading in securi-
ties, and upon dealers and brokers. 1
The traditional dichotomy between legal standards and ethi-
cal standards is thus minimized. Congress authorized the
Commission to set up legal standards through the promulga-
tion of rules which are to be applied in the light of the ethical
considerations of honesty and fairness. Congress thus estab-
lished a system whereby both the letter and the spirit of the
act might be administered concurrently. The spirit is that
of promoting the highest ethics in securities transaction by
requiring full and complete disclosure. The letter is that of
the rules promulgated by the Commission. In effect, Congress
has made it possible for the Commission to engraft a body of
federal common law on the structure of Sections 10(b),
17 (a), and Rule 10b-5. From the beginning the courts and
the Commission recognized the fact that Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 allowed them to reach results more in line with
obligations of fairness than the common law permitted, how-
ever, they were reluctant to abandon all common law restric-
tions and to administer the act on the principles of good busi-
ness ethics alone.
12
In Cady Roberts the Commission administered the act en-
tirely on the basis of the ethical considerations Congress in-
tended. The conduct of the respondent, though not amounting
to common law fraud, was unethical and unfair. Under Rule
10b-5 as interpreted by the Commission, such conduct
amounted to a fraud. The effect of the case is to say that the
possession of information, the use of which by a director,
officer, or ten per cent majority shareholder would be an
abuse of his position, imposes on the recipient an affirmative
11. "Disclosure is the foundation of reliance on self-regulatory ap-
proaches and is the clearest alternative to greater governmental or insti-
tutional intervention." Cary Corporate Standards and Legal Ethics, 50
CALiF. L. REv. 408, 409 (1962).
12. Congress intended that a federal right, uniform in its nature,
should be uniformly enforceable pursuant to federal standards, thus en-
abling the courts to avoid the entanglements and limitations of the com-
mon law. McClure v. Borne Chemn. Co., Inc., 292 F. 2d 824 (2d Cir. 1961),
upheld the spirit of the Act by refusing to apply common law concepts
where it disrupted the Congressional intent even though the Act was silent
on the particular point in question. This decision furthered the estab-
lishment of a body of federal corporate law which is distinct from the
common law. Where a federal right is being enforced and Congress is
silent, state law will control, but only where state law does not cut across
federal intent receiving expression in the federal right sought to be en-
forced. Because the federal statute itself gives the federal court jurisdic-
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duty of disclosure to unsolicited purchasers on the exchange.
If such disclosure is inexpedient or is in itself a breach of
some duty, the alternative disclosure duty is to wait until the
inside information has been made public before dealing in
order that such purchasers might have as full an opportunity
as possible to be cognizant of the risk of the security itself.
The Commission held that the status of insider and the corre-
sponding duty to disclose under the Rule are both created and
defined by the mere possession of inside information regard-
less of the relationship that the recipient has with the cor-
poration. While the trend of the law has been a gradual as-
cent toward higher standards based on ethical considerations,
Cady Roberts marks the highest point thus far in using the
theory of complete disclosure as the principle to eliminate the
dichotomy between legal rules and ethical standards.
Under the common law one party to a business transaction
* is protected only from the material misrepresentations and
misleading half truths of the other party on which he has
relied to his detriment. There is no remedy for damage re-
sulting from the other party's silence about material facts
unless there is an affirmative duty to disclose which duty
arises only where there is a fiduciary or other relationship
of trust and confidence between the parties.13 Prior to 1934
the majority of courts found no fiduciary relationship be-
tween officers or directors and their stockholders. The mere
failure on the part of such insider to disclose any facts per-
taining to corporate affairs and affecting the value of the
stock, which were within his knowledge but unknown to the
shareholder, did not give rise to an action against him as long
as he did not actively mislead the shareholder or make any
'alse misrepresentations. 14 In the absence of actual fraudu-
lent misrepresentation an employee could buy and sell securi-
ties of his corporation as a stranger even though he had in-
side information concerning the increased value of the stock.15
The mere fact of being an insider with knowledge unavailable
to the other party to the transaction did not of itself give
rise to anything from which fraud or unfair dealing might
13. 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §529, 551 (1938): PrOSSER, TORTS. .34
(2d ed. 1955); 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1434 (2d. ed. 1961); Note,
Civil Liability Under Rule X-lOb-5, 42 VA. L. Rnv. 537 (1956).
14. Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581 (N. Y. 1868). See generally,
Annot., 84 A. L. R. 615 (1933).
15. Stout v. Cunningham, 33 Idaho 464, 196 Pac. 208 (1921); Wood-
ruff v. Cole, 307 Mo. 19,269 S. W. 599 (1925).
1963]
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be inferred.' 6 The minority view was that a director or of-
ficer seeking to purchase shares from a shareholder had a
duty to disclose to the shareholder facts which had come to
him by virtue of his relation to the company and were not
known to the shareholder or which might not be readily as-
certainable by the shareholder. This duty was held to be a
fiduciary duty, but courts were reluctant to impose a duty as
strict as that of a trustee. 7 In Hotchkiss v. Fischer's the
court said that purchases by a director of corporate shares
must be closely scrutinized to be sure that they are conducted
with the utmost fairness. The duty to disclose was limited
to those facts which were within the exclusive knowledge of
the insider and which the shareholder by exercise of due dili-
gence could not ascertain. 19 A middle of the road view ad-
16. One early case, Deadrick v. Wilson, 8 Boxt 108 (Tenn. 1874) not
only held there was no fiduciary relationship and therefore no liability
but said that officers were justified in availing themselves of a superior
knowledge gained in their official capacity. Section 16 of the Act remedies
this situation. It is designed to deprive corporate insiders of any incen-
tive to abuse their position by trading in securities of their corporaton
on the basis of information not known to the public. See generally, LAT'TN,
CORPORATIONS 264-266 (1959); Cole, Insider's Liabilities Under the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1984, 12 Sw. L. J. 147 (1958); Meeker &
Cooney, The Problem of Definition in Determining Insider Liabilities
Under See. 16(b), 45 VA. L. Rnv. 949, 979 (1959); Yourd, Trading in
Securities by Dtrectors, Officers and Stockholders; Section 16 of The
Securities Exchange Act, 38 MicH. L. Rnv. 133 (1939); Note, 73 HARv.
L. REv. 1635 (1960); Note, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use of
Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 468 (1947).
17. Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S. E. 232 (1903). To say that a
director who has been placed where he himself may raise or depress the
value of stock "or in a position where he fisrt knows of facts which may
produce that result, may take advantage thereof, and buy from or sell
to one whom he is directly representing, without making a full disclosure
and putting the stockholder on an equality of knowledge as to these facts,
would offer a premium for faithless silence, and give a reward for the
suppression of truth. It would sanction concealment by one who is bound
to speak, and permit him to take advantage of his own wrong, - a thing
abhorrent to a court of conscience. "If a director is in possession of in-
formation which his duty to the company requires him to keep secret, he
may not disclose this to a shareholder since his obligation to the company
overrides that to an individual holder of the stock. The very fact that he
cannot disclose the information prevents him from dealing with one who
does not know the facts and to whom material information cannot be made
known. This case was perhaps the forerunner of the alternative duty to
disclose as set out by the Commission in Cady Roberts. But see, In re
William I. Hay, 19 S. E. C. 397 (1945) (Duty to customers prevails over
duty to the corporation).
18. 136 Kan. 530, 16 P. 2d 531 (1932).
19. The two extremes of this view are represented by Stark v. Soule,
27 N. Y. Week Dig. 80, 9 N. Y. S. R. 555 (1887) where it was held that
since a director had superior means of knowledge, slight circumstances
which had the effect of misleading the shareholder might afford occasion
for redress, and by Boulder v. Stillwell, 100 Md. 543, 60 Atl. 609 (1905)
where parties to a sale were all officers of the corporation the court held
since by reason of their position they had equal means of knowing the
6
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hered to the "special circumstances" doctrine first set out in
Strong v. Repide.20 Under this rule there might be circum-
stances of a nature which rendered the insider's conduct or
failure to make full disclosure fraudulent in law (apart from
the special relationship of the parties) even though a case of
actionable fraud and deceit might not be made out.21 The
"special circumstance" rule neither supports nor repudiates
the theory that a corporate insider has no fiduciary relation
with shareholders from whom he purchases stock of his cor-
poration and that to constitute fraud there must be actual mis-
representation. The rule merely imposes a duty to disclose
in particular situations where a corporate insider has access
to information such as merger, assured sale, or other facts
enhancing or reducing the value of stock known by insiders,
not known by shareholders, and not to be ascertained by an
inspection of the books. 22 Thus, under the common law an
action would not lie for silence or mere passive non-disclosure
unless a fiduciary or other confidential relationship could be
found. Some courts required disclosure where the defendant
had special knowledge unavailable to the plaintiff and fair
conduct demanded disclosure. But even where there was a
duty to disclose, the requirement was only that a reasonable
effort be made regardless of whether the information reached
the other party.23 Liability did not extend to protect buyers
financial condition of the corporation and its future prospects, the false
statements by one relating to such matters could not be fraudulent and
did not of themselves constitute a false representation as to an existing
fact as would sustain an action for deceit.
20. 213 U. S. 419, 53 L. Ed. 853 (1909). See BALLENTINE, CORPORA-
TIONS 213 (rev. ed. 1946); FLTCHER, Cyc. CoRP. §1167-71 (repl. 1947).
21. BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS 213 (rev. ed. 1946).
22. The essence of the special facts doctrine is that a director or of-
ficer stands in a special relation to a shareholder because of his superior
knowledge or means of information which relation, though not as strict
as that of a trustee, gives the shareholder justification for reliance on
statements of a director or officer which reliance would not be justified
if the statements were made by a stranger. Thus, notwithstanding the
fact that there is no fiduciary relation between officers and directors
and shareholders as regards the purchase of stock in the corporation,
the relationship is a circumstance which may enter into the question of
actionable fraud or deceit.
23. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §551. Even under the Securities Exchange
Acts the tendency is to hold that due diligence to make information
publically available is all that is necessary to relieve the defendant from
liability. 3 Loss, SECURITiES RFGULATIONS 1456 (2d ed. 1961). The
Cady Roberts ease implies the contrary: It is because no one had received
the information that the respondent had the duty to forego the transaction
until it was received. The Commission hints that perhaps the respondent
did not have the duty to disclose, since that duty was imposed on the
corporation and they were trying to disclose. Even if he had no duty to
7
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or sellers who were not already shareholders since there it
was even more difficult to find a fiduciary relationship be-
tween the parties, nor did it extend to transactions on the
security exchange. 24 Until Cady Roberts, the courts and even
the Commission were reluctant to extend the application of
the act to transactions on the exchange. Some common law
cases expressing disapproval of unethical conduct in the se-
curities market announced an intention to promote and to
enforce higher ethical standards, but their good intentions
were defeated by the rigid limitations of the common law
remedies.25  The law was at least moving toward the con-
clusion that full disclosure of all material facts must be made
whenever elementary fair conduct requires it.26
The Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934 were
designed to correct the specific deficiencies in the common
law doctrine of fraud27 as applied to transactions in securi-
disclose he had an independent duty to refrain from dealing until those
whose duty it was to disclose had fulfilled their obligations.
24. The theory was that there was no direct communication between
the buyer and seller so no disclosure was appropriate. The nature of the
market is impersonal and, therefore, each person determines for himself
what course of action he should take without influence from any other
person. In Perry v. Pearson, 135 Ill. 218, 25 N. E. 636 (1890), the court
suggested that dealing at arm's length avoids any question of trust rela-
tion between the parties requiring disclosure of any facts bearing on the
value of the stock. And similarly, in Sullivan v. Pierce, 125 Fed. 104 (5th
Cir. 1903), although the court found a confidential relationship between
the parties and a justifiable right to rely on the representations made as
to the value of the stock the action failed because the parties had dealt
at arm's length and thus the sale could not have been made in reliance
upon the buyer's statements.
25. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N. E. 659 (1933). The
court said insiders ". . . cannot be allowed to indulge with impunity in
practices which do violence to prevailing standards of upright business-
men." at 363. See also Oliver v. Oliver, supra, n. 17. Cary, Corporate
Standards and Legal Ethics, 50 CAL. L. REV. 408 (1962); Comment, 32
Min. L. REV. 678 (1934).
26. See PROSSER, ToRTS 535; ,also Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-
Disclosure, 15 TEx. L. REV. 1, 31-40 (1936). Equity courts tended to be
more liberal in imposing a duty to disclose because their emphasis was on
preventing a defendant from obtaining an unfair advantage. Law courts,
however, had to be more strict because a deceit action required the
defendant to compensate the plaintiff for any loss he might have sus-
tained. It has been suggested that equity courts and later the Securities
Exchange Acts concentrate on the defendant's dereliction of duty rather
than on a plaintiff's recovery of profits. Leech, Transaction in Corporate
Control, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 725 (1956). The SEC seems to aim at pre-
venting damage by promoting an atmosphere where free investment judg-
ment may be relied on rather than adding more remedies to offer relief
to those who have already been injured.
27. The term fraud as used in the Act was not meant to be limited to
common law concepts but was intended to include . . . all deceitful prac-
tices contrary to the plain rules of common honesty." Loss, The SEC and
the Broker-Dealer, 1 VAND. L. RaV. 516, 577 (1948), citing People v. Fed-
8
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ties. The anti-fraud provisions are broad remedial provisions
aimed at fraudulent security transactions which harm the
investor and create a threat to the economic prosperity of the
mation. While the common law stresses failure to disclose
and provides remedies to a limited group, the federal law
places emphasis on the positive aspects of disclosure and com-
pels disclosure to the public generally. The anti-fraud pro-
visions, 25 especially Rule 10b-5, provide a broad framework
within which the courts and the Securities Exchange Com-
mission may prohibit any practice or device which they might
deem unfair.
Until Cady Roberts, the courts and even the Commission
unjustifiably restricted the application of Rule 10b-5 to in-
clude only those insiders as defined by 16b (officers, direc-
tors, and 10% controlling shareholders).29 Because of 16b's
-extensive limitation on the activities of corporate insiders
when dealing in securities of their corporation, it seems that
Rule 10b-5 was not meant to be merely another vehicle for
'erated Radio Corp., 244 N. Y. 33, 38, 154 N. E. 655, 657-58 (1926). See
also Ellis v. Carter, 291 F. 2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Hooper v. Mountain
Sec. Corp., 282 F. 2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960); Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., v.
SEC. 177 F. 2d 228 (C. A. D. C. 1949); Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC,
139 F. 2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied 321 U. S. 786, 88 L. Ed. 1077
(1944). Cases used the common law standards for imposing liability in ap-
'plying the Rule, but applied the Rule more broadly than the common law.
. 28. Section 10 provides in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality
,of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
zecurities exchange...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any se-
curity not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the pub-
lic interest or for the protection of investors."
Rule 1ob-5 provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(1) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud.
(2) To make an untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any per-
son, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
29. This definition is embodied in §16 which defines corporate insiders
s officers, directors and "every person who is directly or indirectly the
'beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity
zecurity. . . ." Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §16(a), 48 Stat. §96,
:15 U. S. C. §78 p (a) (1934).
9
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protecting shareholders against abuses in that area, but was
intended to have a broader scope and more far reaching effect.
Even at common law the duty of disclosure is imposed on
officers and directors and, most recently, controlling share-
holders, because of their relationship with the corporation.
This duty runs from the corporate insiders to the corporation
and from the corporation to the other shareholders by virtue
of their relationship with the company. In Cady Roberts the
duty stemmed not from the relationship with the corporation
but rather from possession of knowledge of the corporation's
activities. The duty to deal fairly runs not to the corporation
but to the public directly. The fiduciary duty imposed on
officers, directors, or controlling shareholders because of their
relationship with the corporation arises out of other duties
and considerations such as the duty of loyalty, involving self-
dealing, and agency principles, involving the agent's dealings
with his principal. The respondent in Cady Roberts did not
have a relationship with the corporation and the correspond-
ing duties and loyalties to the corporation, nor did he attain
such a relationship with the acquisition of corporate informa-
tion. The Commission superficially predicates the decision,
at least in part, upon the existence of an imputed corporate
insider relation since the director who gave the information
was also an associate of the brokerage firm. The imputation
concept has been applied in cases where a broker has pur-
chased on behalf of an insider and has knowledge of inside
information or information to impose the same duty of dis-
closure on the broker as that of the insider himself.30 It has
been traditionally held, however, that persons knowingly
joining with a fiduciary in a transaction constituting a breach
of duty or scheme to defraud are liable to the same extent
as the one who breaches his fiduciary duty.31 The require-
ment of "knowingly" means more than investing one's own
funds on a tip received from a director.
2
The establishment of a corporate insider relationship
through the means of the director-associate was superficial
30. Fry v. Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 376 (E. D. Pa. 1947); Hughes &
Treat, 22 S. E. C. 623 (1946); M. S. Wien & Co., 23 S. E. C. 735 (1946).
31. Jackson v. Smith, 254 U. S. 586, 65 L. Ed. 418 (1921); Irving
Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F. 2d 721 (2d Cir. 1934); Ward LaFrance Truck
Corp., 13 S. E. C. 373 (1943): Black v. Simpson, 94 S. C. 312, 77 S E..
1023 (1913) ; White v. Texas Co., 59 Utah 180, 202 Pac. 826 (1921).
32. Manufacturers' Trust Co. v. Butler, 838 U. S. 304, 94 L. Ed. 107
(1949); In re Carlton Crescent, Inc., 173 F. 2d 944 (2d Cir. 1949).
[Vol. 15566
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and unnecessary under the language of the Act. The essential
question of liability on the open market was still open. If
the director had been liable on the open market then the
broker could have been liable in his own right on the same
principle. The cases cited by the Commission as analogous
fall short as authority for the imputed relationship here be-
cause those cases dealt with situations where the broker was
held on breach of duty to disclose that he was an agent for
an insider transacting for his own benefit. In the instant
case there was no scheme between the broker and the di-
rector, and the broker received no profit other than ordinary
commission.38 Thus it would seem that the respondent was
held to a duty to disclose, not because of his relationship with
the director giving rise to an imputed corporate insider status,
but as an insider in his own right because he had possession
of information not publically available and which should have
been public if the transaction were to be conducted honestly.3'
Since the aim of Rule 10b-5 is not to protect the corporation
from loss"5 or to protect the individual shareholder as much
as it is to censure dealings which are unfair to the public
generally, there is no reason to base a duty to the public on
a duty to the corporation.
The prohibitions of the Rule extend to "any person"e in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of securities regardless of
his relationship with the corporation or his duties toward it.
33. It might be argued that he received the additional good will of those
clients for whom he made the profit but his would indeed be a thin ground
on which to base liability. The broker did argue that he acted only out
of duty to his clients but the Commission rejected this contention saying
that clients may not expect a broker to pursue their interests by unfair
methods which constitute violations of the Act. The fact that civil liability
might be denied the private litigant on these facts does not absolve the
broker from responsibility for fraudulent conduct nor does it make disci-
plinary action unreasonable.
34. Query: Would the broker have been liable if he acted upon non-
public information received from one with whom he had no business re-
lationship? Tipees have been held liable if they knew or had reason to
know that the information was given as a breach of trust. Strong v.
Repide, 213 U. . 419, 53 L. Ed. 853 (1909); but see, In re CarltonCrescent, Inc., 175 F. 2d 944 (2d Cir. 1949). Tipee liability has been
implied from RESTATEMENT, TRUSTs §201 (2). For a general discussion of
this topic see 3 Loss, SuCunmuS RE ULATIONS, 1451; Note, Application ofSEC Rule X-lOb-5 to Preivent Nnn-Disclosur'e in the Sale of Corporate Se-urities, 39 CAL14. L. REv. 429 (1951).
35. See Brophy v. Cities Service, 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A. 2d 5 (1949),
where it was held that it was necessary to show that the corporation had
been damaged; a sufficient cause of action was stated if there had beena breach of confidential relation of an employee. "Public policy will not
permit an employee occupying a position of trust and confidence toward
his employer to abuse that relation to his own profit, regardless of whether
the employer suffers too." See also 3 ScoTT TRUSTS §505.1 (1939).
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A violation of duty to the corporation may also be a violation
of the Rule, but to violate the Rule there is no requisite that
there be a violation of duty to the corporation. The Commis-
sion in Cady Roberts interprets the Rule as imposing an af-
firmative duty to disclose on "any person," including, but not
limited to traditional 16b corporate insiders who, in the pur-
chase or sale of securities, pursues a course of conduct which
would operate as a fraud or deceit on "any person."3 6
Having gotten around the corporate insider relationship
problem through broad interpretation of the words "any per-
son," the Commission turned to the question of whether com-
plete non-disclosure is a course of conduct or practice operat-
ing as a fraud and, if so, whether the Rule extends to impose
liability for complete non-disclosure in a transaction on the
open market. In order to establish a common law cause of
action for fraud or deceit, specific elements must be proved
including a material misrepresentation or misstatement of a
material fact which is the proximate cause of injury, intent
on the part of the perpetrator,37 and justifiable reliance by
the injured party. Under Rule 10b-5 all that need be shown
is that in connection with the purchase or sale of securities
there was (1) a misstatement, material misrepresentation or
half truth, or a practice or course of conduct which would
operate as a fraud or deceit on anyone and (2) use of the
mails or some facility of interstate commerce. As has been
shown there is no liability for complete non-disclosure at
common law unless "the one party to a transaction 'by con-
cealment or other action intentionally prevents the other from
acquiring material information' or the one party is under
a duty to the other to exercise reasonable care to disclose the
36. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F. 2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952),
limited "any person" to only buyers and sellers and refused to allow the
Rule to be invoked by one not a buyer or seller. Cadyi Roberts, by over-
throwing the restrictions on "any person" in the first clause of the Rule
has paved the way for extending "any person" beyond buyers and sellers.
37. Intent may have been supplanted in the act by the concept of "will-
ful." The most harsh sanctions are limited to conduct that is willful. How-
ever, willful does not mean that the party must be aware of the fact that
he is violating the law. Knowledge of the legal consequences of an act is
unimportant. It is necessary only that he was fully aware of all he was
doing and was doing it voluntarily. Charles E. Bayley, 35 S. E. C. 33
(1953); Henry Leach, 24 S. E. C. 237 (1946); Thompson Ross See. Co., 6
S. E. C. 1111 (1940). See also 3 LoSS, SECURrrES REGULATioNs 1309-10 (2d
ed. 1961). In Cady Roberts the Commission uses "willful" in the sense
that the broker knew what he was doing. At 34-6668.
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matter in question 'because of a fiduciary or other similar
relation of trust or confidence between them.' "38
Under the Security Acts if the requirements of a common
law action of fraud or deceit are not met but the situation is
one which particularly deserved remedy on equitable prin-
ciples, the courts turned to the failure to disclose and invoked
the sanctions of Rule 10b-5. Thus the courts have applied
10b-5 as a catch-all provision to reach equitable results. How-
ever, none of the cases relied on by the Commission were
decided solely on the basis of complete non-disclosure.39 Those
cases relied on as being ones where a violation of the anti-
fraud provisions was found for mere failure to disclose were
limited to situations in which insiders (16b definition) or
the corporation itself had failed to disclose material facts
when acquiring securities from the shareholders of the cor-
poration. 40 The Commission relied on the SpeeZ and Kardon
cases without indicating the fact that failure to disclose was
coupled with other breaches of duty on the corporate level and
with violations of the other provisions of the Rule. Clause
(2) of Section 17 and Rule 10b-5 do not by their terms cover
complete non-disclosure. The Commission held that the re-
spondent "at least" violated clause (3) of the Rule which
makes it unlawful to engage in any transaction or course of
business "which would operate as a fraud or deceit on any
person." Thus in Cady Roberts, the Commission holds that
fraud is any practice, including complete non-disclosure, which
is unfair as determined by good business ethics.
The broad interpretation of Rule 10b-5, though justified
by the language of the act and the Rule itself, is without
38. 3 LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1434 (2d ed. 1961), citing R-,
STATEMENT, TORTS §550, §551(2) (a).
39. Several eases involved non-disclosure and §3 but each of the de-
cisions involved half-truths which provided an alternative basis for lia-
bility. Ward LaFrance Truck Corp., 174 F. 2d 969 (C. A. D. C. 1949);
Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. DeL 1951); Fry v.
Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476 (E. D. Pa. 1947); Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 73 F. Supp. 789 (E. D. Pa. 1947); William I. Hay, 19 S. E. C. 397
(1945).
40. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), where
failure to disclose the future sale of assets when purchasing minority
shareholders' stock was held to be a violation of all three provisions of the
Rule. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 789 (E. D. Pa. 1947),
in which failure of controlling shareholders to disclose details of agree-
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judicial or administrative precedent.41 By virtue of its
administrative and quasi-judicial authority the Commission
has the power to render its own interpretive decisions. Thus
it may apply its own standards to cases specifically subject
to its jurisdiction without being bound by the carefully
delineated safeguards of the courts. The dichotomy between
the separate approaches is based on the difference in func-
tion between the two bodies. The courts must interpret the
Rule in order to adjust and settle conflicting rights between
parties. Subjective standards of proper conduct would be
entirely inadequate. In a court of law there is constantly the
question of damages and the valuation to be put on intangible
rights and losses (e.g., pain, suffering, consortium). Objec-
tive standards have been applied in law courts because it is
thought they render the administration of law consistent.
42
The Commission, on the other hand, does not primarily settle
disputes between parties; it regulates the activities of a par-
ticular group of persons according to the standards laid down
pursuant to a policy of upholding, promoting, and improving
the integrity of the securities market. The standards, as ap-
plied in this case, were acknowledged to be the subjective
standards of fairness and honesty. The decision leaves se-
curity dealers to a subjective determination as to whether a
course of conduct is proper or improper. This is consistent
with the act in which Congress left the determination of the
standards of fraud up to the Commission. Thus in Cady
Roberts, the Commission finally has an opportunity to ad-
minister the spirit of the act, which is to expand the concept
of fraud so that the investing public may rely without detri-
ment on the honesty and integrity of the security market
and those who deal therein. Any injury received will be due
to the investor's own faulty judgment or the capriciousness
of fate rather than the result of abuse by one made shrewd
by failing to disclose information he obtained which ought
to have been made available to all those concerned.43 By
41. The Commission has always sought a broad interpretation of Rule
10b-5. The briefs submitted by the Commission as amicus curiae bear
this out.
42. In Cady Roberts, the Commission adopts a policy of being con-
sistently subjective, thereby supplying the element of consistency.
43. "That the ignorant may lose out to the shrewd is due largely to the
fact that God did not create all men equal, a situation for which Congress
and the Securities Acts have not yet supplied a remedy." Note, The
Prospects for Rule X-lOb-5: An Emerging Remedy for" Defrauded In-
vestors, 59 YALm L. J. 1120, 1156 (1950).
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using the subjective standard of fair dealing rather than the
common law standards of fraud liability, the Commission
was merely bringing the federal rules up to what the National
Association of Securities Dealers and the New York Stock
Exchange had already provided for in their fair practice
rules whose purpose it is ". . to cope with those methods
of doing business which while technically outside the area
of definite illegality, are nevertheless unfair both to customers
and to decent competition, and seriously damaging to the
mechanism of the free and open market."44
The case has been criticized45 on the ground that a sub-
jective standard is too vague. A broker with important con-
tacts will have knowledge about the corporation that is not
generally available to the public. These critics raise the ques-
tion whether a broker must disclose all confidential informa-
tion obtained in the normal course of investigation or in the
alternative refrain from executing transactions upon receipt
thereof. Cady Roberts seems to be inapplicable in this area,
but the critics say it is too difficult to draw the line between
information which may be acted upon and that which may
not. These critics cast doubt on the propriety of subjecting
persons to liability where no affirmative statements are made
and further assert that the subjective standard is not an ade-
quate standard. They argue that Section 11 of the Securities
Act which deals with liability in connection with registration
statements includes a non-disclosure prohibition. This pro-
vision is not in Section 17(a) or Rule 10b-5. The standards
governing Section 11 are carefully set forth in Schedules A
and B to the Securities Acts and in forms adopted by the
Commission pursuant to the authority granted it. Thus, there
is an established guide, not only for the purpose of planning,
but also for judging thereafter., In contrast, no standards are
set forth in 17(a) or Rule 10b-5 thereby possibly indicating
a Congressional intention to exclude complete non-disclosure
from the concept of fraud. SEC Chairman Cary, in his article,
Corporate Standards and Legal Ethics,46 says that if the use
44. National Association of Securities Dealers, Rules of Fair Practice
E-131 (1958). See also Wall Street Journal, November 19, 1962, "Big
Board Censures Member for Close Tie Between Own Trade Firm's Stock
Letter."
45. Daum & Phillips, The Implications of Cady Roberts, 17 Bus. LAW.
939 (1962). See also 36 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 378 (1962); 71 YALE L. J. 736
(1962); Loss, SEcumiTins RzGULATmoNs (Supp. 1962 at 4-6).
46. 50 CAI"U. L. REV. 408 (1962).
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of information is governed by whether the use would be con-
sistent with ethical standards of fair business dealing, there
will be no difficulty in determining whether disclosure will
be required under the act. The duty to disclose attaches only
where one has possession of information which, if used with-
out disclosure to the other party, would be unfair. If the
party in possession does not wish to disclose, or if it is inex-
pedient to do so due to corporate duties or the complexities of
the exchange, then the alternative duty is to refrain from
dealing. The standards of honesty and business integrity,
while often not the most profitable guides for the moment,
are not arbitrary, nor are they vague.
The proper function of the Securities Exchange Commission
is to raise the standards of the securities market and this
is most effectively done by raising the standards of those who
deal therein. Cady Roberts is the most far reaching example
of this philosophy. While "law in its sanctions is not co-ex-
tensive with morality" 47 is still a prevailing concept, "the
law of today embodies the morality of yesterday and should be
anticipated. '48 Responsibility predicated on unfairness was
said to deter men of principle from accepting managerial
posts. 4 0 The Securities Acts were aimed at shattering the
prevailing idea that it is perfectly reasonable to use inside
information to the disadvantage of another who does not
have such knowledge as long as it does not violate objective
legal standards. Cady Roberts might be said to be aimed at
legal advisers to warn them of the closing gap between law
and ethics; of what may, and probably will, become the law.
"The law . . . represents standards presently imposed by a
governmental or quasi-governmental authority. Ethical ac-
tion.., is that which is motivated by a self-imposed stand-
ard rather than compelled by law. The wise counselor will
assess the need for ethical restraint because he views it as
potential legal restraint. One might describe this as becom-
ing law."50 Cady Roberts represents the extent to which the
Commission is willing to depart from legal rules and standards
to regulate the activities of the securities market and is the
most extreme example of the theory that complete disclosure is
47. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N. E. 659 (1933).
48. Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Ethics, 50 CALiF. L. REV. 408,
416 (1962).
49. Goodwin v. Agassiz, supra note 47.
50. Cary, supra note 48.
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the principle underlying both legal rules and ethical standards
in the securities market. It is a step toward refinement of
a sense of ethics whose basis is the belief that, in the long
run, good ethics is gooO business.
ELLEN VIRGINIA HINES
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